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Abstract 
This paper performs and analyzes hedge fund replication strategies using liquid 
exchange-traded instruments to build linear multi-factor models (“clones”) that mimic 
Hedge Funds returns. First, we follow Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) six-factor model, 
using Barclay Hedge Indexes monthly returns for the period of January 1997 to August 
2017 on seventeen hedge fund strategies. Next, we introduce variations and new 
propositions to the model in order to obtain closer risk-return characteristics, focusing on 
one particular hedge fund strategy: Global Macro. Finally, we use these results to base 
our conclusion and propose applications for this method.  
Our findings promote the use of shorter month period in rolling-windows 
approach and monthly rebalancing strategy for a faster reaction and adaptation to market 
conditions. Also, it suggests the addition of a strategic-specific factor to obtain better 
expected-return replications. These findings are particularly relevant to institutional 
investors that need diversification and could benefit from this asset class exposure, but 
many times are restricted from investing in hedge funds due to their high fee structure, 
illiquidity, and opaque tactics. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the critical turning point of the subprime crisis on March 6
th
 of 2009, when 
S&P 500 Index hit its rock-bottom low at 666.8, US stocks are undergoing one of the 
longest bull markets in history. The average bull market lasts roughly five years
1
, but this 
current run is close to completing its ninth year. In a successful attempt to remedy the 
economic turmoil and bring the economy back to a growth track, the FED quantitative 
easing program flooded the markets with cheap speculative money and compressed 
spreads to historically low figures. These factors combined created a particularly 
challenging equity market, pushing equity active management strategies to an out of 
favor lasting phase.  
The combination of low-interest rates and the population ageing phenomenon 
created a big demand for high yield products and pressured big institutional investors, 
specifically pension plans portfolios, to expand their equities exposure and embrace 
alternative investments as desirable asset classes. Although private investment classes 
such as Real Estate, Private Equity, and Infrastructure Equity are becoming increasingly 
common and gaining market share of pensions’ portfolios, hedge funds absolute return 
strategies have effectively lost market share in these portfolios.  
For the last decade the hedge fund industry failed to generate excess market 
returns despite its expensive fee structure, typically two percent management fee
2
 and 
twenty percent performance fees
3
. Also, because of the lack of transparency and 
                                                          
1
 October 16, 2017, “Bull Market Conditions Driving Flows to Passive.” MFS Investment Management, 
US Equity Blog. 
2
 Calculated over the amount under management (AUM). 
3
 Performance fee is calculated by: {(Fund return – Fund Benchmark) * 20% * AUM} 
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regulation on these instruments many renowned investors and finance academics insist 
that alpha
4
 at the levels hedge funds claimed is a myth.  
A robust replication strategy
5
 could be the answer for those institutional investors 
that search for an additional low correlation asset-class without forswear transparency 
and liquidity. Additionally, in recent years, passive managers have launched thousands of 
new products in response to the inflow of investor capital. In the United States, there are 
now more indices tracking various asset classes than there are publicly traded stocks. 
This creates an extra incentive for replication strategies as they are now cheaper and more 
feasible. 
Due to their complex risk exposures, hedge fund returns yield complementary 
sources of risk premium to a portfolio and are considered a desirable low-correlation 
asset-class. Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) brought the idea of using a multi-factor model to 
regress 1610 hedge funds’ returns on selected risk factors and determine the explanatory 
power of common risk factors for hedge funds components. This paper applies the 
intuition of this study on a data set of Barclay Hedge
6
 Indices extending from January of 
1997 to August of 2017.  We start with the construction of fixed-weight and rolling-
windows clones with the same factor-model specification used by Hasanhodzic and Lo 
(2006) in our data sample.  
Moreover, we focused on the Global Macro strategy for two main reasons, first 
because of its outstanding performance during the 2008 crisis and second because of the 
                                                          
4
 Alpha represents the value that a portfolio manager adds to or subtracts from a fund's return. In other 
words, alpha is the return on an investment that is not a result of general movement in the greater market 
(Source: Investopedia).  
5
  A strategy that copy a hedge fund, or a hedge fund index, risk-return characteristics. 
6
 Barclay Hedge (https://www.barclayhedge.com/about.html) 
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myth and frenzy behind this segment that has among its practitioners’ all-time market 
celebrities such as George Soros and Ray Dalio.  
Our findings advocate for a 12-month rolling-windows approach, shorter than the 
24-moths rolling-windows from Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), data input and a monthly 
rebalance strategy for a faster reaction and adaptation to market conditions, diverging 
from the fixed-weight preference in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006). Also, it suggests the 
addition of a strategic-specific factor to obtain better expected-return replications, in the 
case of Global Macro we found this factor to be the Emerging Market Credit Spread. Our 
results also show a big difference in the replications behavior before and after the 
subprime crisis turning point, with the later period favoring our enhanced replication 
strategy that is able to outperform the index while maintaining a lower volatility 
compared to Global Macro Index. 
  4 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Linear Factor Model 
Linear multi-factor models have been key techniques in the study of the mutual 
and hedge fund returns
7
. The original capital asset pricing model (CAPM) introduced by 
Sharpe (1964) used a single factor model (represented as 𝛽) to calculate the expected 
return of a given asset by identifying its risk related to the market (𝑟𝑚).  
?̅?i = 𝑟𝑓 +  𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓 ), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑓 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
Sharpe (1992) used an asset-class factor model to implement style analysis that 
allowed for investors to achieve their investment goals in a cost-effective manner. In such 
factor model as shown below, each factor ?̅?𝑡𝑖  represents the returns on an asset class, and 
the sensitivities of the factor, which is 𝑏𝑖𝑛, are required to sum to 1. 
?̅?i = [ 𝑏𝑖1 ?̅?1 + 𝑏𝑖2 ?̅?2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑖𝑛?̅?𝑛] + ?̅? 
Later Fama & French (1993) model went one step further by adding two extra 
factors to the original Sharpe equation: SMB (small minus large) and HML (high minus 
low book to market ratios) factors. In the same year, Jagadeesh & Titman (1993) 
presented an additional factor: the momentum factor, a portfolio that is long in past 
winners and short in past losers at equivalent dollar-amount (zero net-value portfolio). 
Next, Carhart (1997) used a combination of these works and published a paper with a 
four-factor model. 
2.2 Linear Regression Application on Hedge Funds Clone Strategy 
In Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), the paper used monthly returns data from 1610 
individual hedge funds in the TASS database, with returns dating from 1986 to 2005, to 
                                                          
7
  Dimitrios Stafylas (2017) 
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estimate strategy clones using liquid tradable instruments. The returns were decomposed 
using a six-factors (tradable assets represented as 𝛽) linear regressions models and the 
output provided estimated betas 𝛽*, that were then used as proxy-weights to build a 
clone-portfolio that should replicate the original returns of that particular fund. The beta 
estimations determined by these linear regressions from individual funds were then 
grouped into 13 different hedge fund strategies and used as asset-classes weights to 
compose one clone portfolio for each strategy. This implementation was done both in 
fixed-weight and in rolling-windows data approach. 
For rolling-windows, Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) used 24-months for each month 
t from t-24 to t-1 to estimate monthly beta coefficients. In this study, it is stated that 
although the fixed-weighted method reduces rebalancing efforts to zero, it has the 
drawback of a look-ahead bias
8
. On the other hand, the rolling-windows method had a 
credible practical application using only previous months’ information, but it had 
possibly costly rebalancing needs. In both cases, on average the clones’ performance was 
well below that of the actual hedge funds.  
According to Amenc, Martellini, Meyfredi & Ziemann (2010), due to the 
difficulty of selecting representative factors and conducting robust replications with 
respect to these factors, using non-linear models does not necessarily enhance the 
replication accuracy. Also, this later study confirmed the initial findings of Hasanhodzic 
and Lo (2006) that the linear model replication results on average in underperforming 
clones. 
                                                          
8
 When you use current data to estimate something in the past, you incur a look-ahead bias, a bias created 
using information or data in a study or simulation that would not have been known or available during 
the period being analyzed. This will usually lead to inaccurate results in the study or simulation. 
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Given the data limitation, we were only able to access to index data and not 
individual funds data, and the flexibility of the hedge funds’ strategies, there is no single 
“best-fit” model that would best mimic the hedge fund returns. The latest study on the 
replication of the hedge fund returns done by Michael S. O'Doherty (2017) applied a 
decision-theoretic
9
 framework and used hedge fund indexes rather than individual hedge 
funds’ returns, which intends to determine the optimal combination of factor models. 
Based on the empirical findings of Dimitrios Giannikis (2011), different risk 
factors affect the returns of different hedge fund indices, and there are different 
asymmetric/nonlinear risk exposures of hedge funds to different risk factors. 
Additionally, the study of Dimitrios Stafylas (2017) gives evidence that the 
macroeconomic risk took a significant part in explaining the hedge fund performance.   
2.3 Focus of this paper   
Inspired mainly by the study of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) and empowered by 
the other papers cited in this literature review, this publication proposes hedge fund 
replication strategies with model calibration and implementation focusing on one specific 
hedge fund strategy.  
Based on our research
10
 and personal experience, we are confident that focusing 
on a single strategy will emerge in a more applicable replication method and improved 
outcomes compared to the cited previous studies. The data used in this paper range from 
1997 to 2017, including many macroeconomic big events such as the Asian Debt Crisis 
(1997), the Russian Default (1998), the Dotcom Bubble (early 2000’s), the Subprime 
                                                          
9
 Decision theory bring together psychology, statistics, philosophy and mathematics to analyse the 
decision-making process. Decision theory is applied to a wide variety of areas such as game theory, 
auctions, evolution and marketing. (Source: Investopedia) 
10
 Dimitrios Giannikis (2011) 
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Crisis (2008) and the European Debt Crisis (late 2009 to 2012). Therefore, it seemed 
particularly opportune to conduct a study in Global Macro strategy.  
  8 
3. Data, Methodology, and Model 
3.1 Data 
We based our project on the hedge fund indexes data from Barclay Hedge and the 
market data from Bloomberg terminal.  The time-period of the data ranges from January 
1997 to August 2017 on a monthly basis. Our time-period includes several significant 
financial events and enables us to deepen our analysis by focusing on the Global Macro 
strategy.  
There are limitations in our data, as indexes aggregate the intellectual factors 
which play critical parts in most hedge funds. In addition, the factors we selected can be 
biased, as there are certain factors we may not take into our model to do the analysis. 
Despite these limitations, our study is still sufficient to provide insightful thoughts as well 
as the inspiration for professional practice.  
3.2 Hedge Fund Indexes 
In this paper, we applied monthly returns of hedge fund indexes of the Barclay 
Hedge database of 17 different strategies
11
: Convertible Arbitrage, Distressed Securities, 
Emerging Markets, Equity Long Bias, Equity Long/Short, Equity Market Neutral, 
European Equities, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Fund of Funds, Global Macro, 
Healthcare & Biotechnology, Merger Arbitrage, Multi Strategy, Pacific Rim Equities and 
Technology. 
                                                          
11
 For the detailing on each strategy refer to Appendix A. 
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3.3 Original Factors 
Following Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), this study initially applies the following 
factors
12
 as tentative explainable variables for the seventeen Barclay Hedge Indexes 
monthly returns: 1) Market proxy: S&P 500; 2) Bond Returns: Bloomberg Barclays Aa 
Corporate Total Return Index Value Unhedged USD; 3) USD Dollar: U.S Dollar Index 
(USDX); 4) VIX: Chicago Board Options Exchange SPX Volatility Index; 5) 
Commodity: S&P GSCI Total Return CME; and 6) Credit Spread: US Corporate Baa and 
10-year US Treasury spread. 
3.4 Methodology and Model 
The methodology of this study is solely based on the linear regression model. 
Following the guidelines of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), we used the 6-factor linear 
regression to decompose the returns of different hedge fund indexes and obtained betas 
based on our inputs.  
Regression equation: 
Rit = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝑘 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐾𝑡 
Then we generated two models for the clones: 1) Fixed-weight clone 2) Rolling-windows 
clone to get the expected returns for the hedge funds of different strategies. More details on 
these models in the following sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
𝐸[R
it
] = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖1 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1𝑡] + 𝛽𝑖2 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2𝑡] + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝑘 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐾𝑡] 
In order to run statistic tests in Exhibit 3.7.1 and Exhibit 3.7.2 below we ran an 
unconstraint regression. 
 
                                                          
12
 For the intuition behind each original factor refer to Appendix B. 
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Exhibit 3.7.1          Multifactor Linear Regression (unconstrained) Model with Betas Statistics (Six Factors case). 
MATLAB Results obtained by regressing the selected risk factors on the hedge fund returns of 
different strategies.  
  
  Credit Dollar Market Bond Vix Commodity 
  t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value 
Convertible Arbitrage -9.17 0.00 0.05 0.96 -2.45 0.01 6.71 0.00 -1.63 0.11 4.10 0.00 
Distress Securities -9.25 0.00 -0.23 0.82 -0.10 0.92 1.54 0.13 -3.19 0.00 4.61 0.00 
Emerging Market -7.29 0.00 -0.54 0.59 3.96 0.00 -0.61 0.54 -3.89 0.00 4.35 0.00 
Long Bias -7.21 0.00 -1.68 0.09 5.64 0.00 -2.63 0.01 -6.76 0.00 4.81 0.00 
Long /Short -4.32 0.00 0.25 0.80 3.79 0.00 -1.30 0.20 -4.27 0.00 4.33 0.00 
European  -4.42 0.00 1.77 0.08 1.86 0.06 0.36 0.72 -2.64 0.01 2.77 0.01 
Event Driven -8.15 0.00 -0.82 0.41 2.26 0.02 -0.06 0.95 -4.52 0.00 4.34 0.00 
Fixed Income Arb. -8.48 0.00 1.73 0.08 1.00 0.32 2.79 0.01 0.96 0.34 5.94 0.00 
Fund of Funds -6.53 0.00 1.04 0.30 2.13 0.03 1.31 0.19 -3.17 0.00 6.26 0.00 
Global Macro -0.66 0.51 0.07 0.95 2.30 0.02 1.99 0.05 -2.90 0.00 3.89 0.00 
Health & Biotech -3.29 0.00 0.42 0.68 3.36 0.00 -1.82 0.07 -3.06 0.00 2.47 0.01 
Merger Arb. -4.52 0.00 0.61 0.54 2.34 0.02 0.54 0.59 -3.57 0.00 3.09 0.00 
Multi Strategy -7.97 0.00 0.65 0.52 -1.39 0.17 5.40 0.00 -3.23 0.00 5.54 0.00 
Pacific Rim Equities* -3.65 0.00 -0.62 0.54 1.25 0.21 -0.96 0.34 -2.77 0.01 2.61 0.01 
Technology* -3.48 0.00 0.57 0.57 4.77 0.00 -3.11 0.00 -4.61 0.00 2.64 0.01 
Equity Market Neutral 1.41 0.16 0.98 0.33 -1.03 0.30 1.69 0.09 -2.40 0.02 3.38 0.00 
Hedge Fund -7.49 0.00 -0.64 0.52 3.89 0.00 -0.04 0.97 -5.61 0.00 6.09 0.00 
 
According to the beta coefficients as the results of the regression model, we can 
find out that the significance of different risk factors based on the t-statistics and P-value. 
For instance, looking at the elevated figures for the t-statistics and low figures of p-
values, the risk factors of market, bond returns, VIX and commodity are obviously 
significant in the Global Macro Strategy, which means that these factors contribute the 
most to the returns of this particular strategy. However, this is only the statistics view, we 
will further elaborate the factors in more details later in this study.  
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Exhibit 3.7.2         Multifactor Linear Regression (unconstrained) Model with Betas Statistics (Seven Factors 
case) 
  
Credit 
Spread 
Dollar 
Index 
SP500  
Market 
Aa 
Bond Vix Commodity EM-T Spread 
  t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value t-Stat P-value 
Conv. Arbitrage 6.40 0.00 0.39 0.70 2.58 0.01 6.65 0.00 0.02 0.98 3.52 0.00 -3.89 0.00 
Distress  5.81 0.00 0.28 0.78 0.20 0.84 1.28 0.20 0.74 0.46 3.88 0.00 -5.94 0.00 
Emerging Market 2.72 0.01 0.26 0.79 4.58 0.00 1.35 0.18 0.16 0.87 3.45 0.00 10.3 0.00 
Long Bias 3.34 0.00 1.18 0.24 6.17 0.00 3.40 0.00 3.82 0.00 4.01 0.00 -7.71 0.00 
Long /Short 1.17 0.24 0.80 0.42 3.97 0.00 1.75 0.08 1.78 0.08 3.58 0.00 -6.02 0.00 
European  2.00 0.05 2.19 0.03 1.86 0.06 0.12 0.91 0.83 0.41 2.14 0.03 -4.17 0.00 
Event Driven 4.05 0.00 0.17 0.86 2.44 0.02 0.58 0.56 1.31 0.19 3.47 0.00 -8.48 0.00 
Fixed Income  6.20 0.00 2.00 0.05 0.98 0.33 2.66 0.01 2.01 0.05 5.48 0.00 -2.79 0.01 
Fund of Funds 3.33 0.00 1.61 0.11 2.18 0.03 1.04 0.30 0.78 0.43 5.63 0.00 -5.76 0.00 
Global Macro 1.09 0.28 0.38 0.71 0.02 2.30 0.07 1.82 0.19 -1.32 3.35 0.00 -3.50 0.00 
Health & Biotech 1.59 0.11 0.67 0.51 3.37 0.00 2.01 0.05 1.73 0.08 2.01 0.05 -2.76 0.01 
Merger Arb. 1.78 0.08 1.07 0.28 2.37 0.02 0.26 0.79 1.45 0.15 2.38 0.02 -4.93 0.00 
Multi Strategy 5.03 0.00 1.09 0.28 1.52 0.13 5.33 0.00 1.21 0.23 4.93 0.00 -4.68 0.00 
Pacific Rim  2.09 0.04 0.41 0.68 1.23 0.22 1.11 0.27 1.61 0.11 2.21 0.03 -2.38 0.02 
Technology* 1.13 0.26 0.96 0.34 4.87 0.00 3.46 0.00 2.67 0.01 2.00 0.05 -4.22 0.00 
Market Neutral 2.21 0.03 1.16 0.25 1.07 0.29 1.58 0.12 1.41 0.16 3.02 0.00 -2.01 0.05 
Hedge Fund 3.41 0.00 0.02 0.98 4.29 0.00 0.55 0.58 2.47 0.01 5.43 0.00 -8.40 0.00 
 
The factor of Emerging Markets Credit Spread is statistically significant, again 
high t-stat and low p-value figures, as we included this factor into our model as shown in 
Exhibit 3.7.2. The inclusion of this factor also enhanced our clone returns as 
demonstrated later. 
3.5 Fixed-weight clone 
Fixed-weights clones use the entire data sample to run a single regression and 
estimate one set of weights that will be implemented in the clone portfolio, in this case, 
the rebalancing is done daily only to adjust the portfolio back to its original weight 
composition, but it should not impose too much rebalancing costs since it should be small 
corrections on deviations from the original configuration. We used MATLAB to run the 
linear regressions, constraining the beta coefficients to sum to one and eliminating alphas 
  12 
(intercepts). Since we are evaluating indexes and not specific funds, the human factor is 
not as material and the elimination of alpha in our regression model does not result in a 
relevant loss because of the aggregation effect of the indexes.  
In our model the least squares algorithm R*it  was applied using the factors’ 
means to fit the mean of the indexes. Later, we used the resulted estimated betas as the 
representative weights for each factor and constructed each clone portfolio accordingly. 
The constructed clone will have the returns that are equivalent to the fitted values 
𝐸[R*
it
]. 
R*it =  𝛽
∗
𝑖1 𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖3 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖4 𝐶𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡 
𝐸[R*it] = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖1 𝐸[𝑆𝑃𝑡] + 𝛽𝑖2 𝐸[𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡] + 𝛽𝑖3𝐸[𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡]+ 𝛽𝑖4 𝐸[𝐶𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑌𝑡] + 𝛽𝑖[𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡] 
3.6 Rolling-windows clone 
Rolling-windows clones use the data sample from a particular month-period to run 
monthly regression and estimate a set of weights per month that will then be implemented 
in the clone portfolio, the rebalancing in this case can be done monthly (or sparser 
periodicity) to adjust the portfolio to the new set of weights, this case should impose 
higher rebalancing costs compared to the fixed-weight clone strategy, since the weights 
may diverge a lot from month to month. 
Initially, we opted for 24-months rolling-windows following Hasanhodzic and Lo 
(2006), that is, for each month t, we used the rolling-windows of 24-months from month 
t-24 to t-1 to estimate the same regression as Rit-k.  
The beta coefficients are indexed by both the k (period) and i (risk factors) and the 
estimated betas 𝛽∗ are applied as weights to determine the returns of the constructed 
clones R*it-k .  
Rit-k =  𝛽𝑖1 𝑆𝑃𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖3 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖4 𝐶𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑌𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑘 
Subject to 1 = 𝛽𝑖1 + 𝛽𝑖2 + 𝛽𝑖3 + 𝛽𝑖4 + 𝛽𝑖 , k = 1, ... 24 
R*it-k =  𝛽
∗
𝑖1 𝑆𝑃𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖3 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖4 𝐶𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑌𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗
𝑖 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑘 
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An important aspect, also described in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), is that fixed-
weight clones incur a clear look-ahead bias, since it uses the entire data sample to build 
its portfolios. While rolling-windows estimations generates monthly rebalancing asset-
allocation weights for its clone-portfolios, controlling for biases and replicating features 
of active management.  
3.7 Rolling-windows calibration 
After replicating Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) models, we implemented a 
sensitivity analysis on the rolling-windows model, relaxing the input parameter 
attempting to improve the model replication capacity. The results appointed for an 
optimal 12-months rolling-windows period. 
Rit-k =  𝛽𝑖1 𝑆𝑃𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖3 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖4 𝐶𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑌𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑘 
Subject to 1 =  𝛽𝑖1 + 𝛽𝑖2 + 𝛽𝑖3 + 𝛽𝑖4 + 𝛽𝑖 , k=1, … 12 
R**it-k =  𝛽
∗∗
𝑖1 𝑆𝑃𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗∗
𝑖2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗∗
𝑖3 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗∗
𝑖4 𝐶𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑌𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽
∗∗
𝑖 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑘 
Although the smaller rolling-windows period is subject to greater estimation 
errors, market fast reaction imposes the need for this shorter window frame. In this stage, 
we also relaxed the original factors by replacing and withdrawing each one of them. 
Later, we tested for an additional strategy-specific factor to close the estimation gap and 
improve the strategy-specific clone quality and accuracy. The results and intuitions 
behind each model parameter will be further elaborated in the following chapter
13
 of this 
study. 
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 Chapter 4 Results, Model Calibration and Implications  
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4. Results, Model Calibration and Implications 
Following Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), we implemented two linear regression 
models to perform a decomposition of each hedge fund strategy’s returns. We then based 
our clone models on the results we got from the decomposition. For each model, we 
calculated the mean returns and the standard deviation to have the insightful information 
about our clone risk-return results and how they compared to the indexes. The statistical 
measure of R-squared as shown on Exhibit 4.1 indicates the percentage of each particular 
Barclay Index movements can be explained by each clone with different approach. 
Exhibit 4.1      Summary of R-squared and F-test - (unconstrained model)  
 
For example, the R-squared for the Global Macro strategy is the highest for the rolling 
window of 12 months approach indicates the Barclay index of Global Macro strategy is 
explained better by the clones, which used the rolling window of 12 months approach 
compared with other approaches. The statistical results of R-squared and F-test after 
incorporating the factor of Emerging Market Credit Spread is displayed on Exhibit 4.2.  
R Squared Adjusted 
R Squared
F-test R Squared Adjusted 
R Squared
F-test R Squared Adjusted        
R Squared
F-test
Conv. Arb. 0.472         0.459       36.0      0.285          0.282       93.2      0.323         0.320       106.0    
Distressed* 0.471         0.457       35.7      0.343          0.340       122.0    0.469         0.467       196.0    
Emer. Markets 0.455         0.442       33.6      0.515          0.513       249.0    0.545         0.542       265.0    
Long Bias* 0.570         0.559       53.2      0.671          0.670       478.0    0.720         0.719       572.0    
Long/Short 0.359         0.343       22.5      0.347          0.344       124.0    0.363         0.360       127.0    
European* 0.223         0.203       11.5      0.104          0.101       27.3      0.138         0.134       35.6      
Event Driven 0.481         0.468       37.2      0.401          0.398       157.0    0.473         0.471       200.0    
Fixed Income Arb. 0.391         0.376       25.8      0.237          0.233       72.6      0.312         0.309       101.0    
Fund of Funds 0.428         0.413       30.0      0.384          0.381       146.0    0.442         0.440       176.0    
Global Macro 0.238         0.219       12.5      0.246          0.243       76.3      0.208         0.205       58.5      
Health & Biotech* 0.221         0.201       11.4      0.076          0.072       19.1      0.080         0.076       19.2      
Merger Arb. * 0.290         0.272       16.4      0.208          0.205       61.6      0.193         0.190       53.2      
Multi Strategy 0.478         0.465       36.7      0.342          0.339       122.0    0.381         0.379       137.0    
Pacific Rim* 0.204         0.184       10.3      0.140          0.137       38.2      0.130         0.126       233.1    
Technology* 0.321         0.305       19.0      0.361          0.358       132.0    0.330         0.327       109.0    
Market Neutral 0.085         0.062       3.7        0.049          0.044       11.9      0.036         0.032       8.4        
Hedge Fund* 0.548         0.537       48.7      0.546          0.544       281.0    0.601         0.599       334.0    
Fixed Weight 12-months Rolling Window 24-months Rolling Window
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Exhibit 4.2      Summary of R-squared and F-test with Emerging Market Credit Spread- (unconstrained 
model) 
 
Meanwhile, we also applied the autocorrelation of lag one into our model to 
assess the illiquidity risks as discussed in the study of Getmansky, Lo and Makarov that 
the autocorrelation can be used to measure the illiquidity risk of the hedge funds (2004). 
As different strategies have different rebalancing requirements, the clones perform 
differently for different strategies and the performance of different types of clones also 
varies. By using the approach of 24-months rolling-windows, most of the autocorrelation 
of lag one decreased, which indicates a slightly declined liquidity risk due to the liquidity 
improves under the embedded rebalancing requirements of the rolling window. 
 
 
 
 
R Squared Adjusted R 
Squared
F-test R Squared Adjusted 
R Squared
F-test R Squared Adjusted        
R Squared
F-test
Conv. Arb. 0.472       0.459        36.0          0.260        0.257       82.3       0.322       0.319        105.0  
Distressed* 0.471       0.457        35.7          0.302        0.299       101.0     0.473       0.471        199.0  
Emer. Markets 0.455       0.442        33.6          0.505        0.503       239.0     0.578       0.576        304.0  
Long Bias* 0.570       0.559        53.2          0.632        0.630       402.0     0.712       0.711        549.0  
Long/Short 0.359       0.343        22.5          0.315        0.312       108.0     0.340       0.337        114.0  
European* 0.223       0.203        11.5          0.084        0.081       21.8       0.107       0.103        26.5    
Event Driven 0.481       0.468        37.2          0.425        0.423       173.0     0.484       0.481        208.0  
Fixed Income Arb. 0.391       0.376        25.8          0.230        0.227       69.8       0.322       0.319        106.0  
Fund of Funds 0.428       0.413        30.0          0.351        0.348       126.0     0.437       0.434        172.0  
Global Macro 0.238       0.219        12.5          0.248        0.245       77.1       0.202       0.198        56.2    
Health & Biotech* 0.221       0.201        11.4          0.040        0.036       9.8         0.046       0.042        10.7    
Merger Arb. * 0.290       0.272        16.4          0.185        0.182       53.2       0.191       0.188        52.5    
Multi Strategy 0.478       0.465        36.7          0.295        0.292       97.9       0.382       0.379        137.0  
Pacific Rim* 0.204       0.184        10.3          0.135        0.131       36.4       0.132       0.129        33.9    
Technology* 0.321       0.305        19.0          0.264        0.260       83.7       0.278       0.274        85.3    
Market Neutral 0.085       0.062        3.7            0.060        0.056       14.9       0.038       0.034        8.8      
Hedge Fund* 0.548       0.537        48.7          0.516        0.514       250.0     0.594       0.592        324.0  
Fixed Weight
12-months Rolling Window 
with EM Credit Spread
24-months Rolling Window 
with EM Credit Spread
  16 
Exhibit 4.2      Summary of lag one autocorrelation for both models 
  ρ1(%) 
fixed-weight 
ρ1(%) 
24-moth  
rolling-windows 
Convertible Arbitrage 24.9% 23.0% 
Distress Securities* 24.4% 24.5% 
Emerging Market 19.8% 21.7% 
Long Bias* 13.5% 12.9% 
Long /Short 10.0% -2.3% 
European*  12.6% 10.6% 
Event Driven 19.4% 18.2% 
Fixed Income Arb. 16.3% 27.7% 
Fund of Funds 15.4% 18.0% 
Global Macro 2.9% 10.0% 
Health & Biotech* 10.3% 9.6% 
Merger Arbitrage* 5.3% 20.5% 
Multi Strategy 18.6% 23.2% 
Pacific Rim Equities* 16.6% 7.2% 
Technology* 4.8% 3.8% 
Equity Market Neutral -1.0% -16.9% 
Hedge Fund 16.2% 15.6% 
* Strategy not present in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) paper. 
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Exhibit 4.3 Summary of 1 dollar invested accumulated return for 24-months rolling-windows monthly 
rebalancing clone portfolios, fixed-weight clone portfolios and Barclay Hedge Indexes. The 
clones were obtained by linear regressions of monthly returns of Barclay Hedge Indexes 
from January 1997 to August 2017 on six factors:  S&P 500 total return, Barclays Aa 
Corporate Total Return Index, the US Dollar Index return, Credit Spread: US Corporate 
Baa - 10-year US Treasury, the first-difference of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), and the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) total return.  
Exhibit 4.4 Individual charts of the same data displayed in the summary of Exhibit 4.2 
 
 
  18 
 
24-Moths Rolling-Windows Clone  Fixed-Weight Clone Barclay Hedge Index 
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24-Moths Rolling-Windows Clone  Fixed-Weight Clone Barclay Hedge Index 
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Exhibit 4.5 Clones’ Statistics & Tracking Errors (Data sample from January 1998 to August 2017) 
   
24-months Rolling-Window Fixed-Weight 
 Strategy  
E(R)  
Index 
STD  
Index 
E(R)  
R-W 
STD  
R-W 
Tracking  
Error RW 
E(R)  
F-W 
STD  
F-W 
Tracking  
Error FW 
Conv. Arb. 6.7% 6.3% 4.4% 5.4% 5.6% 4.3% 5.0% 4.8% 
Distressed* 7.9% 6.9% 5.4% 6.6% 5.4% 3.7% 5.8% 5.3% 
Emer. Markets 10.0% 12.4% 5.8% 12.5% 9.1% 4.4% 10.5% 8.0% 
Long Bias* 8.4% 10.5% 4.8% 10.5% 5.9% 3.9% 10.0% 5.2% 
Long/Short 7.7% 6.4% 3.6% 6.4% 5.8% 3.3% 5.4% 5.0% 
European* 8.4% 7.1% 3.2% 6.2% 7.6% 3.4% 4.7% 6.4% 
Event Driven 8.3% 6.0% 4.8% 6.2% 4.9% 3.7% 5.7% 4.5% 
Fixed Income Arb. 5.7% 5.0% 3.5% 4.8% 4.6% 3.5% 4.1% 4.1% 
Fund of Funds 4.5% 5.1% 3.6% 5.6% 4.4% 3.4% 4.5% 4.0% 
Global Macro 6.3% 5.1% 4.2% 5.5% 5.6% 3.6% 3.7% 4.8% 
Health & Biotech* 13.3% 15.6% 5.4% 11.2% 16.6% 3.5% 8.3% 14.2% 
Merger Arb. * 6.9% 3.1% 3.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.3% 3.3% 3.5% 
Multi Strategy 7.8% 4.4% 4.0% 4.7% 4.1% 3.8% 4.1% 3.7% 
Pacific Rim* 8.6% 8.5% 2.7% 7.2% 9.1% 3.4% 5.3% 7.6% 
Technology* 9.4% 12.1% 2.7% 11.5% 11.1% 3.0% 8.4% 9.7% 
Market Neutral 4.4% 2.8% 2.7% 3.8% 4.3% 3.0% 2.8% 3.8% 
Hedge Fund* 7.9% 6.6% 4.2% 6.9% 4.6% 3.7% 6.2% 4.1% 
Average 7.8% 7.3% 4.0% 7.0% 6.6% 3.6% 5.8% 5.8% 
*Strategy not present in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) paper. 
Although the data source and time-period were quite distinct, the quality of the 
replications obtained by the 24-months rolling-windows clones was similar to the 24-
months rolling-windows clones of the original study conducted by Hasanhodzic and Lo 
(2006). Nevertheless, in our opinion this replication is not of enough quality to justify the 
strategy, considering that current market conditions provide investors with much lower 
returns and, as demonstrated by Exhibit 4.4, the clones underperform the indexes by a 
very significant amount.  
Regarding the fixed-weight linear clones, in our time-frame and data, the results 
obtained were similar to those of the 24-months rolling-windows linear clones, diverging 
the findings from Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006). Our interpretation is that the sub-prime 
  21 
crisis brought a structural break point
14
 in our data set; consequently, our entire-period 
regressions do not provide as precise weights as the original Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) 
study.  
As mentioned before because fixed-weight clones incur from look-ahead bias and 
will not react in changes to market conditions, we believe that rolling-windows 
estimations are more applicable, as it generates monthly rebalancing asset-allocation 
weights for its clone-portfolios, controlling for biases and replicating features of active 
management. Also, this model will avoid issues related to possible structural breaks that 
may occur. 
4.1 Other periods rolling-windows   
After this exercise, we started to conduct experimentation in order to calibrate this 
original 24-months rolling-windows model. The first effort was changing the periodicity 
of the rebalancing of the rolling-windows portfolios to more sparse periods. The results 
were the deterioration of the clones’ ability to replicate the original trends observed by 
the indexes, therefore we continued to use monthly rebalancing. Next, we attempt for 
different timespan in the rolling-windows linear regressions, again periods larger than 24-
months resulted in a deterioration of the clones, so we decided to test smaller periods. 
For most strategies, the autocorrelations for the fixed-weight clones are the 
highest and the 12-months rolling-windows clones are the lowest. These results indicate 
that the liquidity risk decreases using a smaller timespan in the rolling-windows model 
(see Exhibit 4.1.1 below). 
                                                          
14
 When the data have a dramatic event that changes the dynamics of the time-series behaviour and one 
single linear model cannot successfully fit the entire period with a single regression equation. 
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Considering the accumulated returns and observing the charts below, the 12-
months rolling-windows results were an impressive improvement from the original 24-
months period, yielding higher returns for all strategies. On the other hand, this new 
method had a deterioration in tracking error metric and showed a larger volatility (see 
Exhibit 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 below). 
 
4.1.1 Summary of lag one autocorrelation for the three models 
  ρ1(%) 
fixed-weight 
ρ1(%) 
24-months R-W 
ρ1(%) 
12-moths R-W 
Convertible Arbitrage 24.9% 23.0% 3.4% 
Distress Securities 24.4% 24.5% 14.2% 
Emerging Market 19.8% 21.7% 15.7% 
Long Bias 13.5% 12.9% 5.5% 
Long /Short 10.0% -2.3% -5.5% 
European  12.6% 10.6% 2.3% 
Event Driven 19.4% 18.2% 8.7% 
Fixed Income Arb. 16.3% 27.7% 14.0% 
Fund of Funds 15.4% 18.0% 6.8% 
Global Macro 2.9% 10.0% 8.9% 
Health & Biotech 10.3% 9.6% -2.9% 
Merger Arb. 5.3% 20.5% 11.7% 
Multi Strategy 18.6% 23.2% 14.1% 
Pacific Rim Equities* 16.6% 7.2% 21.2% 
Technology* 4.8% 3.8% 4.4% 
Equity Market Neutral -1.0% -16.9% -17.1% 
Hedge Fund 16.2% 15.6% 8.9% 
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Exhibit 4.1.2 Summary of 1 dollar invested accumulated return for 12-months rolling-windows monthly 
rebalancing clone portfolios, fixed-weight clone portfolios and Barclay Hedge Indexes. From 
January 1997 to August 2017 on the same six factors. 
 
Exhibit 4.1.3 Individual charts of the same data displayed in the summary of Exhibit 4.1.2 
 
 
24-Moths Rolling-Windows Clone  Fixed-Weight Clone Barclay Hedge Index 
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24-Moths Rolling-Windows Clone  Fixed-Weight Clone Barclay Hedge Index 
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24-Moths Rolling-Windows Clone  Fixed-Weight Clone Barclay Hedge Index 
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Exhibit 4.1.4 Clones’ Statistics & Tracking Errors with 24-months and 12-months RW  
(Data sample from January 1998 to August 2017) 
 
   
12-months Rolling-Window 24-months Rolling-Window 
Conv. Arb. 
E(R)  
Index 
STD  
Index 
E(R)  
R-W 
STD  
R-W 
Tracking  
Error RW 
E(R)  
R-W 
STD  
R-W 
Tracking  
Error RW 
Covert. Arb. 6.7% 6.3% 6.0% 6.5% 6.1% 4.4% 5.4% 5.6% 
Distressed* 8.0% 6.9% 7.4% 7.7% 6.5% 5.4% 6.6% 5.4% 
Emer. Markets 10.0% 12.4% 9.6% 12.8% 9.7% 5.8% 12.5% 9.1% 
Long Bias* 8.4% 10.5% 7.3% 10.9% 6.7% 4.8% 10.5% 5.9% 
Long/Short 7.7% 6.4% 6.0% 7.3% 6.5% 3.6% 6.4% 5.8% 
European* 8.4% 7.1% 7.3% 7.5% 8.3% 3.2% 6.2% 7.6% 
Event Driven 8.3% 6.0% 6.7% 7.3% 5.8% 4.8% 6.2% 4.9% 
FI Arb. 5.7% 5.0% 4.5% 5.4% 5.2% 3.5% 4.8% 4.6% 
Fund of Funds 4.5% 5.1% 5.4% 6.1% 5.0% 3.6% 5.6% 4.4% 
Global Macro 6.3% 5.1% 5.2% 6.5% 6.1% 4.2% 5.5% 5.6% 
Health & Biotech* 13.3% 15.6% 9.4% 14.6% 19.8% 5.4% 11.2% 16.6% 
Merger Arb. * 6.9% 3.1% 3.4% 4.8% 4.5% 3.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
Multi Strategy 7.8% 4.4% 5.9% 5.4% 4.5% 4.0% 4.7% 4.1% 
Pacific Rim* 8.6% 8.5% 6.7% 10.0% 9.9% 2.7% 7.2% 9.1% 
Technology* 9.4% 12.1% 6.5% 12.6% 11.5% 2.7% 11.5% 11.1% 
Market Neutral 4.4% 2.8% 3.2% 4.4% 4.7% 2.7% 3.8% 4.3% 
Hedge Fund* 7.9% 6.6% 6.3% 7.5% 5.3% 4.2% 6.9% 4.6% 
Average 7.8% 7.3% 6.3% 8.1% 7.4% 4.0% 7.0% 6.6% 
*Strategy not present in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) paper. 
Looking at the exhibits above, although there was a deterioration in the tracking 
error metrics, the improvement in expected returns was expressive and seems like a 
reasonable trade-off and an overall improvement in the model to change 24-months for 
12-months rolling-windows. Though the new clones present larger volatilities (STD = 
annualized standard deviation), these figures are very similar to the index volatilities, so 
an investor should be somewhat comfortable with this level of risk. Because many 
strategies are quite specific
15
 we did not expect all clones to show consistently accurate 
replications. In our point of view to further calibrate the model, it is imperative to 
understand the specific strategy and research specific additional factors relevant to that 
strategy.  Therefore, we decided to choose one Global Macro strategy for a more in-depth 
model building.  
                                                          
15
 Refer to Appendix A. Strategy Definitions for the detailing of strategies. 
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5. Global Macro Strategy - A Study Case  
The reasoning behind our focus in Global Macro hedge fund strategy replication 
is mainly its capacity of preserving capital through a low correlation with the main 
indexes of variable income and fixed income, its mandate is the broadest hedge funds and 
has no formal definition due to its opportunistic nature. Another convenient fact is that 
this strategy can be used on very large amounts under management as it focuses in very 
liquid markets, with an emphasis in currency trading usually. 
Exhibit 5.1 Yearly Returns of the Barclay Hedge Macro Index from 1997 to August 2017. 
 
Typically, a Global Macro manager aims to obtain positive absolute return 
adjusted to a certain level of risk under any market circumstances. For this, it takes 
positions directional (bearish or bullish) or non-directional with or without financial 
leverage and using any instrument, whether liquid or derivative in the foreign exchange 
markets, interest rates, variable income, commodities and exceptionally risk capital. The 
main source of return generation is the analysis of situations of macroeconomic 
disequilibrium fundamental in any international market.  
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The Exhibit 5.3 below shows the detailing of the 12-month rolling-windows 
monthly rebalance strategy obtained by the 6 factors regression; it is quite intuitive to see 
how this process was able to capture the managers’ insights in an opportune and 
consistent system. Global Macro strategy had a superior comparative performance to 
most asset classes in downturn years and in our 12-months rolling-windows strategy you 
can see the translation from the managers knowledge into our model as the disinvestment 
in S&P 500 starts around 2008’s first quarter, before the S&P vast drawdown, and most 
of the portfolio market share is taken by Aa Corporate Total Return Index.  
Exhibit 5.2  Yearly Returns of the Clone 12-months rolling-windows with the 6-factor model
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5.1 Factor selection 
George Soros, one of the most famous investors of all times is adept at Global 
Macro strategy. Three of his most successful trades of all his track-record related to 
macro international critic turning points and took the form of currency bets: He shorted 
the Pound in 1992, profiting from the fall of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism; he 
successfully shorted the Malaysian Baht in the Asian financial crisis of 1997; and most 
recently in 2013 and 2014, he shorted the Yen taking profits out of president Abe’s 
quantitative easing program the deteriorated Japan’s currency16.   
Although the Dollar Index provides a decent proxy for currency trades, because of 
its composition, we thought that this original six-factors-model was missing the 
Emerging Markets specific-effect. Currently, the Dollar Index is calculated by factoring 
in the exchange rates of six major world currencies the Euro (EUR), roughly 8% weight, 
Japanese yen (JPY), roughly 14% weight, Pound sterling (GBP), roughly 12% weight, 
Canadian dollar (CAD), roughly 9% weight, Swedish krona (SEK), roughly 4% weight 
and Swiss franc (CHF), roughly 4% weight
17
.  
The commodity factor also brings some indirect exposure to Emerging Markets 
trends, but the commodity market affects the emerging market countries much more than 
it is affected by them, so it is not heavily influenced by idiosyncratic risk and overall risk 
aversion. To better capture the Emerging Market specific-effect in a consistent and 
extremely liquid manner we turned to the sovereign debt market of Emerging Markets 
countries. The debt market is the best thermometer for these countries because of its 
liquidity and size liquidity, far superior to its stock exchanges.   
                                                          
16
 Wikipedia December 2017 
17
 Investopedia December 2017 
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Also, the debt market has a contamination effect that helps the replication strategy 
to better absorb global market opportunities. As an example, when Russia defaulted in 
1998, the Brazilian currency suffered a strong speculation attack that reflected in 
Brazilian sovereign debt instantly and with high intensity, the Dollar Index and 
Commodity index did not get affected in the same speed and intensity as the Emerging 
Market debt index. 
Exhibit 5.1.1  Monthly Returns of Dollar Index, Commodity, and Emerging Market - Treasury  
 
For those reasons, we opted for the J.P. Morgan EMBI Diversified Sovereign 
Spread (JPEIDISP) Index, that captures the spread return results from the yield difference 
between emerging markets debt and US treasuries and has more than twenty years of 
track-record. The results obtained after the addition of this seventh factor was almost 
imperceptible in the fixed-weight regression model, but in the 12-months rolling-
windows monthly-rebalancing model clones, it significantly improved the quality of the 
returns replication. 
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Exhibit 5.1.4 Summary table of Global Macro Clones, Barclay Hedge GM Index and the S&P 500 Index 
from during their overlapping time-series – December 1998 to 2017 
  SP500 
Global  
Macro 
Index 
Clone 
12RW 
7Factors 
Clone 
12RW 
6Factors 
Clone 
24RW 
6Factors 
Clone 
24RW 
7Factors 
       E[R] 12-M RoR 2.1% 6.0% 6.2% 4.9% 4.0% 4.3% 
STD 12-M RoR 18.2% 5.5% 7.9% 7.4% 6.9% 7.1% 
Tracking Error - - 6.2% 6.1% 5.6% 5.7% 
Smallest 12m RoR -64% -7% -24% -25% -26% -26% 
Largest 12m RoR 39% 30% 29% 22% 13% 14% 
    
 
  # of Negative  
12M RoR 65 31 21 28 23 24 
Exhibit 5.1.5 Chart of Global Macro Clones, Barclay Hedge GM Index and the S&P 500 Index from 
during their overlapping time-series – From December 1998 to August 2017 
 
As mentioned before, our understanding is that the sub-prime crisis brought a 
structural break point to our data set. For this reason, we decided to take a closer look at 
our after-subprime-rock-bottom numbers. The results on Exhibits 5.1.6 and 5.1.7 indicate 
twofold: 1) The clones have embedded the features of Global Macro Strategy, which 
have been demonstrated by the weight dynamics (shown by the color shades on the 
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graph). As can be seen from the graph, the blue shade (represents the weight allocating in 
SP500) got almost vanished on July of 2008, which is prior to the financial crisis. As the 
Global Macro Strategy features in betting on the big event, the quick response of the 
clone to the market indicated by the weights shows a good replication. 2) The clones 
outperformed the Global Macro Barclay Hedge Index by more than 3% p.a. while 
maintaining a lower standard deviation, a lower worst 12-months rolling-windows 
drawdown and less 12-months rolling-windows negative returns.  
Exhibit 5.1.6 Chart of $1-dollar investment in Global Macro Clones, Barclay Hedge GM Index and the 
S&P 500 Index from during their overlapping time-series – From October 2009 to August 
2017 
 
Exhibit 5.1.7 Summary table of Global Macro Clones, Barclay Hedge GM Index and the S&P 500 Index 
from during their overlapping time-series – March2009 to August 2017 
  SP500 
Global 
Macro 
Index 
Clone 12RW 
7 Factors 
Clone 12RW 
6 Factors 
Clone 24RW 
6 Factors 
Clone 
24RW 
7 Factors 
E[R] 12-M RoR 10.2% 2.6% 6.0% 5.6% 4.6% 4.7% 
STD 12-M RoR 7.8% 3.1% 3.0% 2.9% 2.4% 2.5% 
Tracking Error - - 4.2% 4.4% 3.3% 3.4% 
Smallest 12m RoR -9.3% -3.8% -2.3% -2.8% -1.0% -0.9% 
Largest 12m RoR 15.3% 8.9% 12.58% 12.1% 9.8% 9.7% 
#of Negative 
12M RoR 12 22 3 3 4 5 
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Exhibit 5.1.8    Yearly Returns of the Clone 12-months rolling-windows with the 7-factor model January 
1999 to August 2017 
 
 
We believe that the massive liquidity increases after quantitative easing programs 
and the flatter yield curve and its compressed spreads are stealing performance from 
complex models and expensive fee structures and beneficiating our clones’ semi-passive 
strategy. Another relevant observation is that the clones of this study do not account for 
any transactional or operational costs, but considering the available indices trackers in the 
market and the competitive costs that a large institutional client have access to, we 
believe that this over performance is more than enough to absorb these costs.   
16% 
22% 
6% 5% 
11% 9% 
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6. Conclusion 
The linear regression model is a simple but meaningful tool that enables us to 
quickly study the fund performance by decomposing the returns, especially for the funds 
that have exposures to different and broad risk factors. As pointed out by Hasanhodzic 
and Lo (2006), the factor-model method is a process of reverse-engineering of a hedge 
fund strategy, in a way, profiting from the intellectual efforts embedded to the funds that 
compose an index.   
We based our study on the paper of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) and applied the 
same methodology with the updated data to examine the performance of the hedge fund. 
Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) concluded that a fixed-weight model yields a better historical 
performance compared to a rolling-windows model. While our conclusion analyzing a 
different data set is the opposite, our results led us to the conclusion that the fixed-weight 
method yields a similar historical performance as the rolling-windows of 24 months most 
of the time (10 out of 17 strategies).  
The 12-months rolling-windows approach shows a better replication for most 
strategies, yielding closer results to the indexes. The discrepancy between our conclusion 
and the conclusion from Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) might have resulted from the 
differences in the dataset, as our data includes several critical financial events that require 
a more frequent rebalance with an asset-class allocation review, which is embedded in the 
rolling-windows model.  
Although the results from the rolling window of 12-months approach show 
improvement, investors still need to carefully assess each strategy and make 
experimentations to the model in order to improve it before applying the replication 
  38 
method in practice. In our study, motivated by the paper of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), 
we incorporated a new factor that we believe was missing in the original model and it is 
very relevant to the Global Macro strategy: The Emerging Market Debt Credit Spread. 
The improved model returned an enhanced back-testing performance, which brought us 
further interesting findings: 1) The linear regression does not fully replicate the hedge 
fund performance, but mimics the hedge fund strategies to a reasonable degree, especially 
when the model expands the universe of factors by including a proper strategy-specific 
risk factor; 2) the rolling window of 12-months approach combined with the strategy-
specific factor returns an even more practical way of replicating the Global Macro 
Strategy; 3) considering the enhanced model back-testing performance our Global Macro 
clone could still outperform the index and it could prove to be more beneficial to the 
investors because of its semi-passive features, even if we account for transaction costs 
and operational fees.  
There are certain boundaries to our study, especially because linear regressions 
multi-factor models do not fully capture the performance of the hedge fund strategies as 
there are also uncaptured non-linear factors in hedge funds returns. The study done by 
Dimitrios Giannikis (2011) has proven that there are different non-linear risk exposures 
of hedge funds to different risk factors, and this nonlinearity appears to the different risk 
factors rather than the market. By ignoring the presence of non-linearity associated with 
non-linear risk-factors will result in “misleading conclusion about ‘alpha’ and about the 
risk exposures of hedge funds.”18 Therefore, a further study should be conducted to 
incorporate the non-linear factors to the model. Other Improvements that should be 
                                                          
18
 Dimitrios Giannikis (2011) 
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considered in an extension of this study are: 1) The implementation of a cap for a 
maximum amount of leverage to guarantee the feasibility of the strategy implementation; 
2) Attempt for an implementation strategy using available ETFs and account for all 
operational costs. 
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Appendices 
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Appendix A 
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1. Strategy Definitions 
1.1 Barclay Hedge Indexes 
The following is a list of category descriptions taken directly from Barclay Hedge 
documentation, that define the criteria used by Barclay Hedge in assigning funds in 
their database to one of the 17 possible categories. In their documentation it is also 
highlighted for each strategy that only funds that provide net returns are included 
in the index calculation.  
1.2 Barclay Convertible Arbitrage Index 
 
1.3 Barclay Distressed Securities Index 
 
1.4  Barclay Emerging Markets Index 
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1.5  Barclay Equity Long Bias Index 
 
1.6 Barclay Equity Long/Short Index 
 
1.7  Barclay Equity Market Neutral Index 
 
1.8  Barclay European Equities Index 
 
1.9  Barclay Event Driven Index 
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1.10  Barclay Fixed Income Arbitrage Index 
 
1.11  Barclay Fund of Funds Index 
  
1.12  Barclay Global Macro Index 
  
1.13  Barclay Healthcare & Biotechnology Index 
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1.14  Barclay Merger Arbitrage Index 
  
1.15  Barclay Multi Strategy Index 
 
1.16  Barclay Pacific Rim Equities Index 
 
1.17  Barclay Technology Index 
 
  46 
Appendix B 
Following Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006), this study initially applies the following 
factors: 1) Market proxy: S&P 500; 2) Bond Returns: Bloomberg Barclays Aa Corporate 
Total Return Index Value Unhedged USD; 3) USD Dollar: U.S Dollar Index (USDX); 4) 
VIX: Chicago Board Options Exchange SPX Volatility Index; 5) Commodity: S&P GSCI 
Total Return CME; and 6) Credit Spread: US Corporate Baa and 10-year US Treasury 
spread. 
The intuition behind these risk factors are twofold: 1) Representative: They are 
perceived as a reasonably broad cross-section of risk exposures for the typical hedge 
fund; 2) Liquidity: The chosen factors can be easily realized by the relatively liquid 
instruments that will make the constructed clones easy to be implemented. Nonetheless, 
there are forward contracts and futures contracts for each factor such as the forward 
contracts for U.S. Dollar index and futures contracts for the stock and bond indexes as 
well as the commodity index. Also, the OTC market for variance and volatility swaps 
grows rapidly. 
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